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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Labor Law-Preemption-STATE COURT MAY

EXERCISE JURISDICTION

TO RESTRAIN PEACEFUL UNION TRESPASS BOTH ARGUABLY PROTECTED
AND ARGUABLY PROHIBITED BY NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978)
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' guarantees
employees the right to organize and encourages peaceful, private
resolution of labor conflicts.2 To insulate fledgling unions from
hostile judicial attitudes, 3 and to insure uniform application of the
Act, Congress created the National Labor Relations Board
4
(NLRB) and granted it jurisdiction over labor disputes.
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,5 the Supreme
Court declared that the NLRA preempts state jurisdiction over
conduct arguably protected or arguably prohibited by the Act. Although Garmon's "arguably prohibited" prong has been riddled
with exceptions allowing state jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
until recently had not limited the preemptive sweep of the "arguably protected" prong. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
District Council of Carpenters,6 however, the Court upheld state
jurisdiction to restrain peaceful union trespass that was both arguably prohibited and arguably protected by the NLRA. The
Sears Court added a balancing test to its analysis of arguably pro-

'

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976). Congress enacted the NLRA in three major

installments-the Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (creating the National Labor
Relations Board and enumerating federally protected and unfair labor activities); the
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (separating
the adjudicative and prosecutorial functions of the Board and adding several union unfair
labor practices); and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin)
Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (further regulating union reporting practices
and allowing state actions concerning coriduct over which the Board declines jurisdiction).
For background of the legislative history of natiQnal labor legislation, see R. GORMAN,
BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAWv 1-6 (1976); SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAw; AMERICAN BAR
Ass'N, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw chs. 1-4 (1971 & Supps. 1971-77).
2 See Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337, 1352-53 (1972).
3 Prior to enactment of the NLRA, state and federal courts often treated organizational efforts by employees as tortious conspiracies or illegal restraints of trade, and liberally granted injunctions against such activities. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE,
THE LABOR INJUNCTION 26-29 (1930).
4 See Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953), quoted in note 12 infra.
5 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
6 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
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tected conduct, weighing the state interest in assuming jurisdiction
against the need for uniform application of federal labor policy.
Although the Sears approach-balancing interests to create
exceptions within both prongs of Garmon-is an encouraging development, retention of Garmon's "arguably" test as a threshold to
balancing serves no useful purpose. Moreover, Garmon suffers
from the typical infirmities of a wooden rule garnished with an
unstable set of exceptions-it encourages misdirected lower court
analysis and is unfair to litigants. The Court should retire Garmon,
and retain a test that balances state and federal interests. A properly formulated balancing test for the state courts would eliminate
the disadvantages of the Garmon rule with little risk of state court
interference with federal labor policy.
I
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In section 7 of the NLRA, Congress granted employees the
right to organize and join labor organizations, and to engage in
7
collective bargaining and mutual protection activities. Section 8 8
forbids unfair labor practices, including employer interference
with employees' section 7 rights. The NLRB is empowered to prevent what section 8 prohibits. 9 Congress did not, however, address the extent to which the NLRA preempts state jurisdiction
over labor disputes; that task fell to the courts.' 0
A. Early Preemption Cases
The Supreme Court early on made clear that the NLRA
preempts state jurisdiction to regulate conduct protected by secSection 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
8 29 U.S.C. § 158.
9 29 U.S.C. § 160.
10 "The statutory implications concerning what has been taken from the States and
what has been left to them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness by
the process of litigating elucidation." International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356
U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
7
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tion 7 or prohibited by section 8.11 Two rationales justify barring
state jurisdiction over such conduct. First, placing primary jurisdiction in the NLRB promotes uniform interpretation of the
NLRA. 1 2 Second, prohibiting state courts from applying their
own laws to conduct also prohibited by,section 8 promotes uni13
formity of remedy.
The Court's early decisions did not, however, make clear the
breadth of its labor preemption doctrine. According to the narrow
view, insulation of national labor policy justified preemption of
state jurisdiction to apply local law only against conduct specifically
protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8.14 A second,
11See Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (protected by § 7); Garner v. Teamsters
Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 500-01 (1954) (prohibited by § 8).
12
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced
by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to
confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and
specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief
pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain
uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and
conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward
labor controversies.
Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1954).
13 Id. at 498-99. Professor Cox notes that "[i]f
Congress were to make employer unfair
labor practices crimes and authorize private suits for damages, the amendments would be
regarded as a major change in labor policy. No less a change of policy results if a state
creates the crime or right of action for damages." Cox, supra note 2, at 1343.
On the other hand, the federal scheme presupposes the application of at least some
kinds of state law to conduct prohibited by § 8 in order to protect local interests. The
Court has consistently upheld state jurisdiction to enjoin and award damages for violent or
menacing conduct also prohibited by § 8. See, e.g., UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958);
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 271-74 (1956) (the Kohler case); United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942). The Laburnum Court attempted to reconcile the application of state remedies in violence cases with Garner's prohibition against
supplementary state remedies for conduct violating § 8:
To the extent that Congress [in granting the NLRB authority to forbid or
enjoin prohibited conduct] prescribed preventive procedure against unfair
labor practices, [Garner] recognized that the Act excluded conflicting state procedure to the same end. To the extent, however, that Congress has not prescribed procedure for dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there is no ground for concluding that existing criminal
penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated.
347 U.S. at 665.
14 See UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949)
(the Briggs-Stratton case) (upholding state jurisdiction to regulate "quickie strikes" neither
protected by § 7 nor prohibited by § 8. The Court stated: "We find no basis for denying to
Wisconsin the power, in governing her internal affairs, to regulate a course of conduct
neither made a right under federal law nor a violation of it." Id. at 265.
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more expansive theory of preemption transcended specific NLRA
provisions. It characterized the Act as a comprehensive federal
scheme of delicately balanced labor-management interests. According to this view, Congress intended to occupy the field, ousting state jurisdiction over, some conduct neither specifically protected by section 7 nor prohibited by section 8.15
B. The Garmon Rule
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,'16 a state court
deciding that picketing and secondary pressure violated state law
had awarded damages to an employer. 17 Without deciding
whether the union's conduct was governed by NLRA sections 7
and 8, the NLRB had previously declined to exercise jurisdiction
over the dispute. The Supreme Court reversed the state court's
award of damages, holding that states were preempted from regulating conduct that was arguably protected by section 7, or arguably prohibited by section 8.18 The Court's test reserved for the
NLRB the exclusive power to decide whether labor-management
activity came under the protection or prohibition of the NLRA,
thus reducing the risk of erroneous state court assumption of
jurisdiction.' 9 The test offered two practical advantages: (1) it
was easy for state courts to apply, and (2) it sharply curtailed the
is

The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of specified types of
picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be free of other
methods and sources of restraint. For the policy of the national Labor Management Relations Act is not to condemn all picketing but only that ascertained
by its prescribed processes to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is implicit in the Act that the public interest is served by freedom of labor to use the
weapon of picketing. For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the
state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the
federal Act prohibits.
Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 499-500 (1954) (dictum). Commentators
describe this third kind of preempted conduct as "permitted." Permitted conduct is insulated from state, but not employer, interference; the Garner dictum did not decide that the
union had a right to use permitted picketing against employers, but only that states could
not limit union freedom to use the weapon. Protected conduct, on the other hand, is insulated from employer as well as state interference. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor
practice for employers to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise" of
rights protected by § 7. See Cox, supra note 2, at 1345-46; Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered:
The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 469, 477-81 (1972). For more
recent cases adopting the expansive view suggested in Garner, see note 79 infra.
16 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
17 Id. at 239.
18 Id. at 244-45.
29 Id.
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need for ad hoc Supreme Court adjudication of state preemption
cases.

20

The Garmon rule postponed the choice between the narrow
and expansive theories of preemption. A Board decision that
conduct was neither protected nor prohibited would "raise the
question whether such activity may be regulated by the States,'
In effect, however, the "arguably" test promoted an expansive result by insulating from state jurisdiction, pending NLRB determination, some conduct not specifically protected or prohibited by
the Act.

22

C. Exceptions to Garmon's "'Arguably Prohibited"Prong
From its inception, the "arguably prohibited" prong of the
Garmon test suffered from exceptions that soon limited its utility.
A statute enacted in the same year that the Court decided Garmon
allowed state jurisdiction over section 8 disputes where the NLRB
declined to assert jurisdiction. 2 3 The Garmon Court itself recognized two exceptions to accommodate earlier decisions allowing
state jurisdiction where the arguably prohibited conduct was a
"peripheral concern" of the NLRA 4 or involved union vio-

20 Id. at 242. In reviewing the justifications for adopting the Garmon rule, the Court has
said: "[We cannot] proceed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether each particular
final judicial pronouncement does, or might reasonably be thought to, conflict in some
relevant manner with federal labor policy." Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289 (1971). Since "[v]ery few labor activities aimed at management are
not either arguably protected or arguably prohibited by the NLRA" (Cox, supra note 2, at
1350), Garmon promised to reduce sharply Supreme Court ad hoc review of erroneous
state court assumption of jurisdiction.
21 359 U.S. at 245 (footnote omitted).
22 For a discussion of the expansive view, see note 15 and accompanying text supra, and
note 79 and accompanying text infra. For a general discussion of the Garmon rule, see Cox,
supra note 2, at 1348-51.
23 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub, L. No.
86-257, § 701(a), 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1976)). See Cox, The
Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. Rav. 257, 262
(1959). Statutory exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB over § 8 conduct
have been created for the federal courts as well. These provide federal court jurisdiction to
award tort damages for injury to business or property resulting from unfair labor practices
(29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976)) and over suits for breach of collective bargaining agreements
(29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976)).
24 359 U.S. at 243-44. The Court cited International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,
356 U.S. 617 (1958), which upheld state jurisdiction to order a union to reinstate a wrongfully expelled employee, even though the union conduct may have violated § 8. But cf.
Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 293-97 (1971) (union's
membership clause not peripheral concern).
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lence.2 5 The violence exception soon grew into a "local interest"
exception, allowing state jurisdiction over conduct touching interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." 2 6 Subsequent decisions upheld state jurisdiction to regulate such less
violent, arguably prohibited activities as obstructive picketing,
27
malicious libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The need for exceptions to the Garmon rule's "arguably prohibited" prong illustrates its overinclusiveness. In eliminating the
risk of conflicting state remedies for specific conduct unlawful
under the NLRA, the test frustrated state remedies for general
tortious conduct that only incidentally affected federal labor policy.
D. A Balancing Test for State and Federal Interests Within Garmon's
"Arguably Prohibited" Prong
The proliferation of Garmon exceptions produced defensible
results, but complicated a preemption test formerly known for its
ease of application. 28 In Farmer v. CarpentersLocal 25,29 the Court
struggled to reduce this complexity by stating the factors common
to all exceptions allowing state jurisdiction over arguably prohibited conduct. A union member had brought a state tort action for
emotional distress, alleging union discrimination in job referrals.
Although section 8 arguably prohibited the discrimination,30 the
Supreme Court upheld state jurisdiction by balancing "the state
interests in regulating the conduct in question ...[with] the potential for interference with the federal regulatory scheme." 3 1
Two factors in Farmer indicated a strong local interest: (1) the
offense affected a personal, rather than an economic, interest; 32
25 359 U.S. at 244 & n.2. See cases cited in note 13 supra.

26 This language comes from Garman itself (359 U.S. at 244), but the Garmon Court
cited only violence cases (id. at 244 n.2).
27 See, e.g., Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress); NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 74 (1973) (reasonableness of union
fines); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (union breach of statutory duty of fair representation); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (malicious libel); UAW
v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (mass picketing and threats of violence).
28 Indeed, one commentator wrote that "the Garmon test can now be described only by
reference to its exceptions." Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and
Individual Rights, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 1037, 1041 (1973).
29 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
30 Discrimination in hiring-hall referrals is prohibited by NLRA §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and
8(b)(2).
31 430 U.S. at 297.

32 The Court said that the decisions permitting the exercise of state jurisdiction in tort
actions rests on "the nature of the State's interest in protecting the health and well-being of
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and (2) state law allowed recovery only in cases involving "outrageous" conduct. 33 Two factors indicated a weak federal interest: (1) the "outrageous" conduct clearly was not protected
under section 7,34 and (2) "the state-court tort action [could] be adjudicated without resolution of the 'merits' of the underlying labor
dispute." 35 "On balance," said the Court, "we cannot conclude
actions
that Congress intended to oust state-court jurisdiction over
36
case."
this
in
alleged
that
as
such
activity
for tortious
II
SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO V. SAN DIEGO COUNTY
DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS

In October 1973, representatives of a San Diego carpenters'
union determined that individuals not dispatched by the union
hiring hall were performing carpentry work at a Sears department store in Chula Vista, California. After requesting in vain
that Sears employ only union-dispatched carpenters, the union
began picketing the store site on Sears' property. 37 When the
union refused Sears' request to remove the pickets, Sears filed a
trespass complaint in the Superior Court of California. Prior to an
adversary hearing on the complaint, the court entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting union picketing on Sears' property. The union removed its pickets to the public sidewalks. The
court subsequently granted a preliminary injunction, from which
the union appealed. Upholding state jurisdiction, the California
Court of Appeals found trespass laws to come within the "local
interest" exception to Garmon.38 The Supreme Court of Califorits citizens." Id. at 303. Violence, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
are directed against persons.
33 Our decision rests in part on our understanding that California law permits
recovery only for emotional distress sustained as a result of "outrageous" conduct. The potential for undue interference with federal regulation would be
intolerable if state tort recoveries could be based on the type of robust language and clash of strong personalities that may be commonplace in various
labor contexts.
Id. at 305-06.
34 430 U.S. at 302.
35 Id. at 304. Under California law, recovery of damages for emotional distress required proof only that the union intentionally engaged in outrageous conduct causing the
employee's distress. Recovery did not hinge on proof of actual or threatened discrimination. Id.
36 Id. at 305.
37 436 U.S. 180, 182 (1978).
36 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 52 Cal. App.
3d 690, 696-97, 125 Cal. Rptr. 245, 248-49 (1975). For discussion of the "local interest"
exception to Garmon, see notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra.
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nia reversed, finding state jurisdiction preempted. 39 Because the
union's trespassory picketing sought to "secure work for the
Union's members," the trespass was "concerted activity" arguably
protected by section 7. 4 ' The trespass was also arguably prohibited; if the picketing objective had been to force employer recognition of the union, the union's failure to file a petition for a
41
representation election would have violated section 8(b)(7)(c).
The court recognized contrary state court decisions on trespassory
picketing, 42 but noted that the United States Supreme Court had
never endorsed an exception for peaceful trespass arguably protected by the NLRA.4 3
39 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 17 Cal. 3d
893, 553 P.2d 603, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976).
40 Id. at 898, 553 P.2d at 608, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
41 Id. at 900-01, 553 P.2d at 609, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
42 Id. at 906 n.8, 553 P.2d at 613 n.8, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 453 n.8. For state cases upholding state jurisdiction to regulate trespassory union conduct, see May Dep't Stores Co. v.
Teamsters Local 743, 64 Ill. 2d 153, 355 N.E.2d 7 (1976) (arguably protected trespass);
People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529, 349 N.E.2d 832, 384 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976) (union chanting
and obstruction of entrance); Hood v. Stafford, 213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964)
(obstruction of entrance); Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Local 444, 16 Wis. 2d
499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962) (peaceful picketing of store front). For cases denying state
jurisdiction to regulate peaceful trespassory activity, see Reece Shirley & Ron's Inc. v. Retail
Store Employees Local 782, 222 Kan. 373, 565 P.2d 585 (1977) (no jurisdiction unless
threat to public safety or denial of reasonable ingress and egress); Commonwealth v.
Noffke, 364 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977) (no jurisdiction to enforce criminal statute
against union organizer disseminating information to employees on company property);
Broadmoor Plaza, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 21 Ohio Misc. 245, 257 N.E.2d 420
(1969) (peaceful picketing in public shopping center); Freeman v. Retail Clerks Local 1207,
58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961) (en banc) (union picketing of shopping center).
"I Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 17 Cal. 3d at
905, 553 P.2d at 612, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 452. Three Supreme Court cases decided prior to
Garmon had discussed the extent to which peaceful union trespass was protected by § 7. In
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), the Court held that the NLRB could
not compel an employer to allow nonemployee distribution of union literature on company
premises. The Court said, however, that in some circumstances employer property rights
must yield to the § 7 right of union organization. 351 U.S. at 112 (dictum). In Youngdahl
v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957), the Court held that a state court injunction directed
against violent or obstructive picketing could not lawfully enjoin all union picketing of the
premises. Id. at 139-40. And in Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc. 353 U.S. 20
(1957), the Court held that state jurisdiction to issue a broad injunction against union
picketing, trespass, and secondary pressure on suppliers was preempted. The Court
explicitly left open the question of whether a state could exercise jurisdiction to issue a
narrowly drawn injunction against peaceful trespass. Id. at 24.
Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 283 Ala. 171, 214 So. 2d 913 (1968), cert. granted, 396
U.S. 813 (1969), cert dismissed, 397 U.S. 223 (1970), presented the kind of narrowly drawn
trespass injunction upon which the Court in Fairlaum Meats had reserved decision. But the
Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted. Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring opinion supporting state jurisdiction over union trespass. Claiming that trespass laws
were part of the general backdrop of state law that Congress had not intended to preempt
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Rejecting a "literal, mechanical" application of the Garmon
rule, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 44 The Court
quoted Farmer,45 and endorsed exceptions to Garmon where arguably prohibited conduct meets two conditions: first, a significant
state interest in protecting its citizens; second, little risk that state
jurisdiction will interfere with NLRB primary jurisdiction to enforce section 8 prohibitions. 46 Without discussing the first condition, the Court found the second satisfied because the controversy
before the state court differed from that which could have been
presented to the NLRB under section 8.
In Sears, the state
controversy involved the picketing location, whereas the NLRB
controversy would involve the picketing objective. 4" Because the
controversies

were "different

... (as in

Farmer),"'4 9 the

Court concluded that the rationale for preempting arguably
prohibited conduct did not apply.5 0
The Court next considered the arguably protected character
of the trespass. It admitted that where conduct is arguably protected, the state court controversy potentially overlaps with an
NLRB section 7 determination. 51 The supremacy clause of the

by enacting the NLRA, the Chief Justice argued that the "local interest" and "peripheral
concern" exceptions should allow state jurisdiction even over arguably protected trespass.
397 U.S. at 227-29. At least two state courts have assumed jurisdiction in explicit reliance
on Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion. See Sheet Metal Workers Int'I Ass'n v. Carter, 133 Ga. App. 872, 212 S.E.2d 645 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976); May Dep't
Stores Co. v. Teamsters Local 743, 64 Ill.
2d 153, 355 N.E.2d 7 (1976). See generally
Broomfield, Preemptive FederalJurisdictionOver Concerted Trespassosy Union Activity, 83 HARV.
L. REv. 552, 554-55 (1970).
44 436 U.S. 180, 188-89 (1978).
45 "Our cases indicate ... that inflexible application of the doctrine is to be avoided,
especially where the State has a substantial interest in regulation of the conduct at issue
and the State's interest is one that does not threaten undue interference with the federal
regulatory scheme." Id. at 188 (quoting Farmer, 430 U.S. at 302).
46 436 U.S. at 196.

47 Id. at 197. Unfortunately, the Court did not delineate the degree of difference required in order to avoid preemption of the state controversy. The distinction between
separate controversies arising from the same set of facts and separate aspects of the same
controversy is rarely clear.
48 If the objective of the picketing had been to coerce Sears into assigning work away
from its employees to union members, the picketing would have been prohibited by
§ 8(b)(4)(D). If the objective of the picketing had been to force Sears to recognize the
union-"recoguitional picketing"-§ 8(b)(7)(C) would have prohibited it unless a petition
for a representation election had been filed within 30 days. Thus, the illegality of the
picketing under the NLRA depended upon NLRB determination of its objective, not its
location. 436 U.S. at 198, 201 nn.31 & 32.
49 Id. at 197. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
50 Id.

at 198.

51 Id. at 200-01.
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United States Constitution 52 requires that a state court decide the
same issue that the NLRB would determine-whether the trespass' is actually protected by federal law-prior to granting relief
under state law. 53 Nevertheless, said the Court, "there was in fact
no risk of overlapping jurisdiction in this case." 5 4 Regardless of
whether the state suit was allowed, the employer had no standing
to invoke NLRB determination of whether section 7 protected the
trespass. 55 Absent a union decision to file a section 8 unfair labor
practice charge against the employer, the Board could not determine the section 7 issue.56 Thus, preemption of state jurisdiction
57
would have relegated the employer to self-help remedies.
The Court concluded that permitting state courts to evaluate
the merits of the union's section 7 defense before applying local
law posed little threat to national labor policy. Trespass, the Court
declared, is "far more likely to be unprotected than protected." 58
Moreover, where there is a strong argument that the trespass is
protected, the union will likely respond to an employer's demand
to depart by filing a section 8 charge. 59 This filing would allow
NLRB adjudication of the status of the trespass. Thus, the
employer's need for a forum to determine the legality of the tres-

52 U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2.

53 436 U.S. at 201. This obligation exists independently of the labor law preemption
doctrine. It derivies from the familiar supremacy clause analysis of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), and exists whenever a state court seeks to apply local law against
conduct potentially protected by federal law. See Cox, supra note 2, at 1340-41.
54 436 U.S. at 201.
55 The NLRB may hear only cases alleging § 8 unfair labor practices. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 160 (1976).
5 436 U.S. at 201.
57 Id. at 202. The preemptive sweep of the "arguably protected" test as applied to
trespassory picketing is particularly troublesome. Although unlawful under state law, such
conduct is often not arguably prohibited by § 8, leaving the employer without access to the
NLRB. Preemption of state jurisdiction in these cases leaves the employer with no forum,
limiting him to "the unsatisfactory remedy of using 'self help' against the pickets to try to
provoke the union to charge the employer with an unfair labor practice." Longshoremen's
Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 201-02 (1970) (concurring opinion,
White, J.). See Broomfield, supra note 43, at 562-68.
58 436 U.S. at 205.
59 The NLRB had previously taken the position that mere resort to the courts by an
employer does not violate § 8. See NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 142 (1971).
Thus, the union can protect itself by filing a § 8 charge with the NLRB only if the
employer has demanded that the union leave the premises prior to initiating his trespass
claim. This demand becomes the basis for the union's § 8 allegation of interference with its
§ 7 rights. The Sears Court held that, at least as long as the NLRB holds to the position
noted above, such a demand is a precondition for state court jurisdiction. 436 U.S. at
207-08 n.44.
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to national labor polpassory picketing "outweighed" any danger
60
jurisdiction.
court
state
by
icy created
The majority opinion did not determine whether state jurisdiction is preempted if the union does file a section 8 charge
when asked to leave the premises. Two members of the majority
added separate opinions in which they disagreed on this issue.
Justice Blackmun argued that the exclusive unfair labor practice
jurisdiction of the NLRB ousts state jurisdiction pending NLRB
determination of the section 8 charge."' In contrast, Justice
Powell argued that state courts should be able to grant preliminary injunctive relief against trespass pending NLRB disposi62
tion.
Joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, Justice Brennan dissented from the majority opinion on three major grounds. First,
he asserted that the majority had underestimated the risk to national policy in allowing state courts to determine the likelihood of
section 7 protection before applying local law. 63 Second, he ar60 Id.

at 206-07.
61 Id. at 209-10. This view rests on the traditional arguments for preempting jurisdic-

tion over prohibited conduct: uniformity of NLRA interpretation and uniformity of remedy. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
62 436 U.S. at 212-14. Concerned that delays in the NLRB hearing process pose a
"danger of violence" even after the union has filed a § 8 charge, Justice Powell would have
allowed aggrieved employers to seek "orderly interim relief." Id. The Sears Court, however,
sought only to provide the aggrieved employer with a forum to determine the status of the
dispute. It did not seek to remedy the inadequacies of NLRB procedures through state
court intervention. Once the union has filed a complaint with the NLRB, the employer has
his forum. State courts should then defer to NLRB expertise.
63 The dissenters disagreed with both of the Court's reasons for concluding that the
state determination did not threaten the federal scheme. First, the dissent challenged the
Court's reliance on NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), discussed in note
43 supra, for the proposition that trespass is unlikely to be protected:
Babcock involved a trespass on industrial property which the employer had
fenced off from the public at large, and it is grave error to treat Babcock as
having substantial implications for the generic situation presented by this case.
To permit trespassory § 7 activities in the Babcock fact pattern entails far greater
interference with an employer's business than does allowing peaceful nonobstructive picketing on a parking lot which is open to the public and which has
been used for other types of solicitation.
436 U.S. at 231. Second, the dissent challenged the Court's assertion that where the trespass is protected, the union will respond to the employer's demand to depart by filing an
unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB:
A request that a trespass cease may or may not so threaten the union as to lead
it to go to the trouble and expense of attempting to invoke the Board's jurisdiction, and the strength of the argument that the conduct is protected will frequently be a factor of no relevance....
... The Court assiduously avoids holding that resort to the Board will oust
a state court's jurisdiction and is divided on this question.
Id. at 232-33 (footnote omitted).
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gued that the kinds of trespassory union conduct that most
threaten local interests are not arguably proteted, and are already subject to state jurisdiction under existing exceptions to
Garmon's "arguably prohibited" prong. 6 4 Third, he feared that
state courts might construe Sears broadly, assuming jurisdiction
whenever employers confronted with arguably protected conduct
65
are unable to invoke an NLRB section 8 determination.
III
TOWARD A MORE RATIONAL TEST FOR PREEMPTION

A. Sears' Impact on Arguably Prohibited Conduct
Although the Sears Court endorsed Farmer's flexible approach
to preemption, 66 it balanced competing state and federal interests
incorrectly. The Court overestimated the state interest, which was
significantly weaker than the state interests supporting other "arguably prohibited" exceptions. The tort in Sears threatened not a
personal, but a business interest. 67 The trespass did not realistically portend violence. 68 Unlike Farmer, Sears involved state law
that was not limited to the regulation of "outrageous" conduct.
In addition, the Court underestimated the federal interest in
preempting state jurisdiction. The Court's reliance on Farmer to
create a "same or different controversy" test 69 for threats to
NLRB primary jurisdiction insufficiently safeguards federal labor
70
policy. Unlike Farmer, where a union member sued his union,
Sears required resolution of a dispute between labor and
management interests. If the picketing in Sears was actually prohibited by section 8, failure to oust state jurisdiction would threaten
7
the remedial balance of the federal scheme. 1

64
65

Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 236. Such broad construction is likely. See notes 74-76 and accompanying text

infra.

66 See note 45 supra.
67

The Farmer Court had characterized exceptions to "arguably prohibited" preemption

as resting on "the State's interest in protecting the health and well-being of its citizens." 430
U.S. at 303.
68 One commentator discussing peaceful trespass has argued against "stretching the
term [violence] to include peaceful activity which shows no signs of presently becoming
violent and which does not physically interfere with the employer's operations or others'
access to his place of business." Broomfield, supra note 43, at 565-66 (footnote omitted).
6' See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
10 See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
71 See note 13 supra.
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B. Sears' Impact on Arguably Protected Conduct
Sears is the first post-Garmon case to uphold state jurisdiction
over arguably protected conduct.7 2 By balancing state and federal interests within Garmon's "arguably protected" prong, Sears
mirrors Farmer's balancing approach to the "arguably prohibited"
prong.7 3 Taken together, the two cases land a one-two punch
that threatens to knock out the exception-riddled Garmon rule.
State courts are likely to interpret Sears broadly, although a
narrow reading is possible. 74 Because the Court discussed trespassory conduct in its generic form,' 5 the exception must extend
to all instances of peaceful union trespass. Moreover, the other
factors the Court considered will likely exist whenever employers
confronted with arguably protected conduct are unable to invoke
an NLRB section 8 determination.7 11 In short, Sears paves the
72

Justice Brennan, for the dissent, went so far as to say: "[Ilt
has heretofore been

absolutely clear that there is no state power to deal with conduct that is a central concern
of the Act and arguably protected by it ...." 436 U.S. at 223 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted). See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
73 See notes 29-36 and accompanying text supra.
74 [T]he Court apparently intends to create only a very narrow exception to
Garmon-largely if not entirely limited to situations in which the employer first
requested the nonemployees engaged in area-standards picketing on the
employer's property to remove the pickets from the employer's land and the
union did not respond by filing § 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice charges ....
436 U.S. at 234 (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.).
75 "[W]hile there are unquestionably examples of trespassory union activity in which
the question whether it is protected is fairly debatable, experience under the Act teaches
that such situations are rare and that a trespass is far more likely to be unprotected than
protected." 436 U.S. at 205.
,6 See notes 44-60 and accompanying text supra. The factors the Court considered may
be grouped as follows:
Strong State Interest

Weak Federal Interest

(1) denial of any remedy
to employer
(2) risk of violence

(1) no threat to NLRB
primary jurisdiction
(2) "trespass" likely to
be unprotected
(3) union may protect
itself by filing § 8
charge.

State factor (1) and federal factors (1) and (3) exist whenever an employer who demands
that a union cease to engage in arguably protected conduct cannot himself secure an
NLRB § 8 determination. Under Sears, the employer's demand is a precondition of state
jurisdiction. See note 59 supra. Employers who have read Sears will invariably make such
demands, since the result will be either state jurisdiction or a union § 8 charge and NLRB
resolution. The Court mentioned state factor (2) but did not discuss it; it is difficult to
argue that any real risk of violence existed in Sears. See note 68 supra. Thus, none of the
factors mentioned in Sears seem likely to limit state court expansion of Sears' rationale to
regulate other arguably protected conduct.
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way for broad state inroads on Garmon's "arguably protected"
prong.
Given the Court's new willingness to create further exceptions
by examining competing interests within both prongs of the Garmon rule, that rule's usefulness has ended. The original Garmon
formulation offered two practical advantages: it was easy for state
courts to apply and its broad sweep rendered erroneous statecourt assumption of jurisdiction unlikely, thereby making Supreme Court review unnecessary. The proliferation of exceptions
to Garmon destroys both advantages; application of the rule is difficult, and the Supreme Court must continually review the scope
of an ever-lengthening list of exceptions.
Not only has the Garmon test lost its advantages, but it also
retains disadvantages. First, it encourages misdirected argument
and analysis at the state court level. State court jurisdiction remains preempted under Garmon unless Supreme Court balancing
of state and Federal interests has created an applicable exception;
retention of Garmon thus tempts state courts to assert jurisdiction
by stretching the contours of existing exceptions without focusing
on the extent to which national policy requires exclusive federal
jurisdiction.7 7 Second, Supreme Court concern for the vitality of
the Garmon test can cause unfairness to litigants. In particular
cases, the Court may preempt state jurisdiction that would not
interfere with federal labor policy in order to reaffirm the
7
weakened Garmon rule.

8

The more state courts are hemmed in by sweeping preemption rules which
prevent them from reaching a sensible decision on the facts of a particular
case, the more they are likely to struggle to evade or to avoid the rules. The
disposition of difficult cases may not be greatly facilitated, and there will be
some compulsion to a kind of lawlessness in the federal system which cannot
be effectively policed.
Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARV. L. REv. 641, 683
(1961).
78 See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). In
Lockridge, a union had terminated the membership of a bus driver who failed to pay his
monthly dues. Lockridge brought a breach of contract action against the union, claiming
that his expulsion was premature and therefore violative of the union constitution. The
state court reinstated Lockridge and granted compensation for lost wages. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction to remedy any wrong
resulting from the discharge, because the breach of contract was also an unfair labor practice under § 8. The Court canvassed existing exceptions to Garmon, failing to fit Lockridge's case into any of them.
The Court's preemption of state jurisdiction in Lockridge was unfortunate. First, the
conflict did not pit labor against management. Rather, it was an internal matter between
union and member. Second, construction of the union constitution and collective bargaining agreements does not require the expertise of the NLRB. Courts, not the NLRB, usually
17
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Third, the exception-riddled Garmon superstructure is not
even the exclusive test for preemption. When union conduct is
not arguably protected or prohibited, the Supreme Court has
sometimes gone beyond Garmon to preempt on the ground that
the challenged conduct is an economic weapon intended to be
free from state interference. 79 In short, the rule is underinclusive in some contexts, as well as overinclusive in others.,,"
C. A Balancing Test for Preemption
The Sears Court's willingness to reject mechanical application
of either prong of the Garmon rule in favor of a reasoned weighing of state and federal interests marks a long-needed shift in national labor policy. But the Sears approach needs improvement.
The Garmon rule should be abandoned. Moreover, the majority
viewed trespass as likely to be unprotected,8 1 and therefore believed it "anomalous" to deny the employer a state remedy in deference to a federal law he could not invoke.8 2 The dissenters,

have jurisdiction over such matters. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). Lockridge clearly suffered
an injustice from the Court's decision to preempt state jurisdiction. See Cox, supra note 2,
at 1339; Lesnick, supra note 15, at 482. The Lockridge Court's reluctance to define another
exception to Garmon appears explicable only as a reaction against widespread doubt as to
the continued vitality of the Garmon rule. Justice White observed in dissent that "the 'rule'
of uniformity that the Court invokes today is at best a tattered one, and at worst little more
than a myth." 403 U.S. at 318. A balancing test without Garmon would avoid the injustice
arising from doctrinally-based reluctance to carve out further exceptions.
79 See, e.g., Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964). The union had violated state law by persuading one of Morton's customers to boycott Morton's business. The
conduct was neither arguably protected by § 7 nor arguably prohibited by § 8. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court barred application of the state law, explaining:
This weapon of self-help, permitted by federal law, formed an integral part of
the [union's] effort to achieve its bargaining goals during negotiations with
[Morton]. Allowing its use is a part of the balance struck by Congress between
the conflicting interests of the union, the employees, the employer and the
community.
Id. at 259 (footnote omitted). See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (state injunction against union employees'
refusal to work overtime preempted notwithstanding prior NLRB dismissal of § 8 charge).
Lodge 76 and Morton thus adopted the expansive view of preemption introduced eleven
years earlier in Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). See note 15 and
accompanying text supra.
80 The overinclusiveness of the "arguably prohibited" prong and the development of
exceptions to it are discussed in notes 23-27 supra. More than one writer has urged that
Garmon be scrapped in favor of a direct consideration of the effect that state jurisdiction
would have upon the federal regulatory scheme. See Cox, supra note 2, at 1351-68;
Michelman, supra note 77, at 680-83.
8" See note 75 supra.
82 436 U.S. at 206-07.
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viewing at least some trespass as likely to be protected, were less
concerned with the employer's remedy. 3 To resolve this division, a workable preemption test should look beyond the generic
term "trespass" and balance competing interests in particular instances.
The following test would provide the particularity needed in
preemption analysis while retaining solid guidelines for state court
decisionmaking. First, the state court must determine that the law
it seeks to apply is one of general applicability, affecting employee
organization, collective bargaining, or labor disputes only incidentally. This requirement would preclude state courts from enforcing state labor relations laws in these areas, which is almost certain
to interfere unduly with the federal scheme.8 4 If this condition is
met, the state court should examine relevant NLRB and federal
court precedent, and assess the likelihood that the challenged
conduct is protected by section 7. The court should decline jurisdiction if it appears at least as probable as not that the conduct is
protected. If the conduct is probably not protected, the court
should ask whether application of the state remedy conflicts with
85
section 8's accommodation of labor and management interests.
If no conflict exists, the court should feel free to exercise jurisdiction.
If remedial conflict does exist, however, the state court
should examine the strength of the state interest. Several factors
indicate a strong state interest: (1) the need to protect personal,
rather than economic interests; (2) the danger of violence absent
state regulation; and (3) the extent to which preemption would
deny the aggrieved party any forum to bring suit. 8 6

The state

court should then weigh the state and federal interests, assuming

83 "[T]he denial to the employer of a remedy is an entirely acceptable social cost for the
benefits of a preemption rule that avoids the danger of state-court interference with national labor policy." Id. at 227.
84 See Cox, supra note 2, at 1356. For cases denying state-court application of state labor
relations laws in deference to the federal Act, see Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S.
485 (1953); UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); LaCrosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State
Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
85 There are two ways in which the state remedy might conflict with such an accommodation. First, the conduct that the state seeks to regulate might be specifically prohibited by
§ 8. Second, conduct not specifically prohibited might nevertheless be "permitted"-where
the prohibition of certain activities raises the presumption that Congress intended others
be left unregulated by the states. See notes 15, 79, and accompanying text supra.
86 The Sears and Farmer Courts considered these factors within the Garmon test. See
notes 29-36, 76, and accompanying text supra.
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jurisdiction only when an overwhelming need for state regulation
87
exists.
The foregoing test eliminates the problems associated with
the Garmon rule.8 8 Moreover, abandoning Sears' generic
characterization of the challenged conduct would achieve more
precision in balancing interests in particular cases. The principal
objection to jettisoning Garmon in favor of such direct examination
of the particular, rather than the generic, character of the challenged conduct is the increased risk of erroneous state court decisions. This risk, however, is no longer great. First, the gradual
development of NLRB and federal court precedent on NLRA issues provides clearer standards for initial state determinations
than existed prior to the Garmon decision. 89 Second, because
unions are far stronger and more widely accepted today than when
the NLRA was passed, 90 they do not need the same measure of
federal protection. Third, the NLRB may seek a federal injunction against state court actions preempted by the NLRA. 91 The
possibility of such intervention limits the threat to national policy
flowing from erroneous state assumption of jurisdiction.

87 Even though regulating union violence would in some circumstances require an accommodation between labor and management interests, overwhelming state interest would
justify state jurisdiction. On the other hand, no overwhelming state interest would be required for state jurisdiction in cases like Farmer, where the challenged conduct is between
unions and their members and does not involve a labor-management accommodation.
88 See notes 77-79 and accompanying text supra.
s9 In Sears, for example, a state court could have relied on cases suggesting that § 7
protection of trespass has been upheld only where the union has no reasonable access to
employees through alternative means of communication. See, e.g., NLRB v. Tamiment,
Inc., 451 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1971) (union lawfully denied entrance to resort area where no
attempt to use alternative means of communications, such as mails or notices), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1012 (1972); NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's, Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967)
(NLRB order requiring employer to permit nonemployee union organizers to solicit
employees on premises upheld where employees not reachable by other practicable means
and employer showed no possible detriment from allowing their presence). The question
of what constitutes reasonable access to employees through alternative channels of communication has been discussed in the NLRB cases. See, e.g., Scholle Chem. Corp., 192
N.L.R.B. 724 (1971) (union access insufficient where employees could not be identified
because they shared private access road entry with workers from other plants.
90 See generally D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 1-41

(1970).
91 See NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971). The anti-injunction statute prohibits a federal court from enjoining state proceedings "except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Court, however, has recognized an exception for suits
brought by the United States. See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220,
224-26 (1959). The Court in Nash-Finch held that the NLRA granted the NLRB implied
authority to obtain a federal injunction against state court action preempted by the Act.
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CONCLUSION

Upholding for the first time state jurisdiction over conduct
arguably protected by the NLRA, the Sears decision further
erodes the exception-riddled Garmon test for labor preemption.
The Court should discard Garmon and retain a properlyformulated balancing approach for the state courts. Such an approach would remedy the complexities and inadequacies of the
Garmon rule with little threat of increased state encroachment on
federal labor policy.
William B. B. Smith V

The Court declared that the Board "moved to prevent 'irreparable injury to a national
interest.' The Board is the sole protector of the 'national interest' defined with particularity
in the Act." 404 U.S. at 145 (footnote omitted) (quoting Leiter Minerals, 352 U.S. at 225-26).
See also Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955)
(§ 2283 bars private party from injunctive relief in federal court against state court
antipicketing order, unless federal court previously acquires jurisdiction pursuant to NLRB
§ 8 adjudication). See generally Broomfield, supra note 43, at 576 & n.135.
With the Sears decision opening up new opportunities for state courts to assume jurisdiction within the "arguably protected" prong, NLRB reliance on Nash-Finch to restrain
erroneous state court action should increase.

